Across 2022–2026, 43 distinct public security records touch the six Ethereum consensus clients — Prysm leads with 12, Grandine shows only 2

Asked (summary):

From public security advisories, bug bounty disclosures, postmortems, audit reports, and maintainer discussions, build a deduplicated table of distinct security incidents affecting the Ethereum consensus clients Prysm, Lighthouse, Teku, Nimbus, Lodestar and Grandine, 2022 through 2026 — one row per incident, with client, versions, date, source type and status, attack class, attacker prerequisites, faithfully stated impact, fix reference, primary-source URL and a supporting quote. Public information only; leave unsupported fields null; do not infer undisclosed vulnerabilities.

The collection holds 47 conservatively screened public records dated March 2022 to September 2026, drawn from 25 independent hosts (the largest host supplies 7 rows, 14.9%). After editorial deduplication of plainly identical events, 43 distinct records remain below. They span confirmed incidents (16), bounty disclosures (9), maintainer advisories (6), audit recommendations (3) and open discussions (9) — most rows are not exploited attacks. Grandine has only two public records here; that is sparse coverage, not evidence of absence. Scan conducted through 2026-10-12.

Records by year and client

Each cell counts public security records for that client and year; darker means more. A black dot marks cells containing at least one confirmed incident (an observed event as stated by the source). Click a cell to filter the table; hover for the record names.

The May 2023 finality incidents hit mainnet from both sides: Prysm's attestation replay strain delayed finality for 4 then 9 epochs (~28 ETH of penalties estimated) — prysm.offchainlabs.com

The single consolidated Lighthouse BlocksByRange crash earned the period's top $50,000 bounty for a remote beacon-node crash via an overly large count value — blog.ethereum.org

2026 is the busiest year (14 records), but over half of them are open discussions or advisories — spec-boundary questions around fast confirmation rules and fork transitions, not exploited attacks — ethereum-magicians.org

The one cross-client record, "Ghost in the Block" (Sep 2024), reported that in a multi-client environment the network partitions and halts completely because new blocks cannot be produced — asymmetric.com

Complete evidence table

Client Year Source status Source type Attack class

Date	Client	Incident	Status	Type	Attack class	Affected / fixed	Prerequisites · impact · fix	Source

Method: 47 public records (security advisories, bounty disclosures, postmortems, audit reports, maintainer and specification discussions) covering Prysm, Lighthouse, Teku, Nimbus, Lodestar and Grandine, dated 2022-03-02 to 2026-09-03, gathered from 25 independent hosts; scan conducted through 2026-10-12, public information only. Four records were consolidated as duplicates of the same events: the second May 2023 Lighthouse BlocksByRange crash report (a secondary press cross-post), the Prysm v7.0.1 release note and a later third-party retrospective of the December 2025 Fusaka mainnet incident, and the Nimbus v26.2.0 fix note for the February 2026 mainnet fork (its version and fix details were retained on the postmortem row), leaving 43 distinct rows. Source wording for impact and prerequisites is preserved verbatim; null means the source did not state it. Counts measure public records, not exploitation; no current-code assessment and no inference about undisclosed vulnerabilities. Long quotes are truncated in the table for space — follow each source link for the full text.

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